Tag: United Kingdom

Best in Energy – 4 July 2022

Australia’s export earnings rise on energy prices

South Africa’s electricity shortages are worsening

U.K. electricity pricing – space and time (parts 1-3)

Biden/Bezos disagree on causes of inflation ($FT)

U.S. government split on lifting China tariffs ($FT)

NATO’s resolve tested by economic downturn ($FT)

U.S. refineries push crude processing to limit ($BBG)

U.S. CENTRAL BANK is now expected to raise rates earlier and more aggressively to bring inflation under control, with traders anticipating rates will peak around the end of the first quarter or the start of the second quarter of 2023. By implication, the business cycle is expected to slow significantly by the end of this year, creating conditions for inflation to moderate and the central bank to begin easing interest rates a few months later by the second quarter of 2023:

U.S. MANUFACTURERS reported much slower growth last month. The Institute for Supply Management (ISM)’s purchasing managers’ index slid to 53.0 in June (45th percentile since 1980) from 56.1 in May (76th percentile) and 60.9 a year ago (97th percentile):

U.S. MANUFACTURERS reported a decline in new orders for the first time since the first wave of the pandemic in 2020. The ISM new orders index slumped to 49.2 in June (18th percentile) from 55.1 in May (45th percentile):

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Best in Energy – 29 June 2022

Aramco’s disputed maximum output capacity ($BBG)

Copper prices fall to 16-month low on recession fears

G7 leaders try to design a price cap for Russia oil ($FT)

G7 officials negotiate price cap with India and China

Murban front-month spread at record $9/bbl ($BBG)

U.K. plans to halt gas flows to Europe in a crisis ($FT)

China’s northern drought and southern floods (trans.)

U.S. energy and employment in 2021

U.S. FINANCIAL CONDITIONS are tightening at the fastest rate for more than 40 years, according to the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (“Policy nimbleness through forward guidance”, FRBSF, June 28):

LONDON’s coal market in the late 1830s and early 1840s saw the last and most ambitious in a long line of attempts to restrict supply to keep up prices. The volume of coal sold each day on the city’s coal exchange was linked to prevailing prices on a sliding scale. If prices rose, more coal was sold. If prices fell, a smaller volume was offered for sale. An example of the sliding scale from February 1837 is reproduced below. The “limitation of the vend” was managed by the London coal factors acting on behalf of and in conjunction with the coal mine owners of the Northeast.

The system was possible because cargoes of coal carried by ship from the Northeast to the Port of London could only be sold and unloaded in strict order of arrival. Regulations enforced by the port authorities and the coal factors themselves required unsold and unloaded ships to wait their turn in the lower reaches of the river. Ships could only proceed to the “legal quays” or for lightering from midriver in the Pool of London once the factors had arranged a sale and the city’s metering office (which measured and later weighed the cargos) had assigned a metering officer.

The coal owners were organised in a series of coal trade committees which forecast demand and allocated output among the mines. The London factors had their own society which managed the rules of the turn system, the market, and the sliding scale as well as reporting on market conditions and cheating efforts to the coal trade committees (“Sea coal for London”, Smith, 1961).

The “limitation of the vend” and the “turn” system eventually broke down in the early 1840s in the face of increased supply from new sources in the Northeast and other parts of the country. At the same time, increasing numbers of vessels avoided the costly wait for sale and unloading because they were delivering cargoes for the government or the rapidly growing gas-manufacturing companies. Instead of waiting for sale after arrival in the port, more and more cargoes were sold prior to arrival and in some cases even before loading in the Northeast.

Before the system collapsed, the queue of unsold and unloaded ships in the river, which could amount to hundreds of vessels at a time, stuck for days or even weeks at a time, rafted along both banks from London Bridge down to Greenwich, with more queued downriver in sections managed by the harbour master all the way to Gravesend, attracted adverse attention from consumers, the city government and parliament, especially at times of high and rising prices, triggering multiple enquiries into anticompetitive practices.

Half-hearted efforts to resurrect the system in the later 1840s and early 1850s were unsuccessful because the system of supplying coal by ship faced rapidly growing competition from the delivery of coal by the new railways to the metropolis. Rail deliveries were not covered by the ship-based system of waiting turn or the sliding scale. The rail network also opened up new inland sources of coal supply in Yorkshire, Durham and the Southwest to compete with the traditional producers in the Northeast, overwhelming efforts at market management.

Development and deployment of steam-powered coal ships rapidly displacing the traditional sailing ships from the early 1850s onwards also made a return to the turn system impossible. Steam-powered ships were faster, larger and needed fewer crew members so they were cheaper to operate. But they were also more capital intensive so their profitability depended on maximising time spent voyaging and minimising delays loading and unloading. Steam-driven ships could not afford to wait their turn for sale and unloading. Many were contracted to gas companies, which had always been exempt from the turn system, and often bought direct from the mine owners in the Northeast, bypassing the factors and the coal exchange. The rest usually voyaged with orders to sell immediately on reaching the port – or the cargo had already been sold before they were even loaded.

The limitation of the vend and the turn system is a fascinating case study in the how to make a cartel work and the problems that can cause it to break down, anticipating many of the practices and challenges faced by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the wider group of exporters (OPEC+).

Rough procedure for sale of coal in London during the late 1830s and early 1840s under the limitation of the vend and turn system:

  • Coal Trade Committee of major mine owners in the Northeast of England forecasts coal demand;
  • Total coal production apportioned between mines according to quotas;
  • Coal mine owner sells coal to ship owner at the quayside in Northeast of England;
  • Ship owner conveys cargo down east coast to Thames Estuary;
  • Ship reports to Coal Factors’ Office at Gravesend;
  • Ship given turn number based on strict order of arrival;
  • Ship’s papers and cargo details expressed by steamer or horse to London;
  • Ship also reports to Harbour Master at Gravesend for section order;
  • Ship directed to one of seven sections in the Lower Thames between Northfleet and Blackwall to wait turn;
  • Cargoes for the government or for gas-manufacturing companies sent direct to unloading wharves, thereby avoiding turn keeping;
  • Cargo registered with both the Coal Exchange and with Metering/Weighing Office ;
  • Cargo entered into both the Sales Turn and the Metering Turn lists;
  • Ships can appeal to magistrate for immediate unloading on safety grounds;
  • Ships caught cheating sent to bottom of sales and/or metering lists;
  • Coal Factor appointed by coal mine owner files paperwork with Customs and Lord Mayor’s office and pays bond;
  • Cargo waits turn for sale with the number of cargoes sold each limited according to prevailing prices on a sliding scale;
  • Cargo sold on Coal Exchange by Factor to a professional First Buyer;
  • Coal Meter/Weigher appointed to measure the volume of cargo as unloaded;
  • Ship given permission to proceed upriver to the Lower Pool for unloading;
  • Unloading gang appointed by the owner of one of the local pubs*;
  • Metering officer and unloading gang actually unload cargo at specified minimum rate per day;
  • Payment terms: one-third cash, one-third in note payable in sixty days, one-third in four days after sale;
  • Coal Factor notifies coal mine owner of completion of sale in accordance with obligations;
  • Ships caught deviating from the system refused future cargoes by sellers in the Northeast;
  • Ship returns to the Northeast to collect next cargo;
  • Coal Factors Society sends regular report on market conditions to coal owners in the Coal Trade Committee.

* Not a joke. Gangs got hired on the understanding they would spend a large part of their earnings in the pub. There were 70 public houses between the Tower of London and Limehouse where men who wanted to work would assemble. “He who spent most at the public house had the greatest chance of work” (“London labour and the London poor”, Mayhew, 1851).

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Best in Energy – 22 June 2022

U.K. energy supplier failure has cost £2.7bn

India urges refiners to buy Russia oil ($WSJ)

China’s northern heatwave and southern floods

OPEC’s spare capacity decision ($BBG)

Thailand reduces LNG imports ($BBG)

Xilodu hydropower station (trans.)*

Xiangjiaba hydropower station (trans.)*

* The Xilodu (13.9 GW) and Xiangjiaba (7.8 GW) mega-dams on the Jinsha River between the provinces of Sichuan and Yunnan have almost as much combined generation capacity as the much more internationally famous Three Gorges hydropower station (22.5 GW). Hydro generation on the Jinsha plays a critical role in power supply for the southern export manufacturing hub around the Pearl River delta (including Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Hong Kong) as well long-distance power transmission to Shanghai. Southern rainfall and reservoir levels are therefore critical for electricity availability and the region’s demand for coal from the north.

EU28 GAS INVENTORIES increased by an average of +5.6 TWh per day over the seven days ending on June 20, decelerating from more than 7.4 TWh per day in the middle of May. But storage has filled at a record rate this year and the pace of injection was clearly unsustainable; some slowdown in the rate of injection was therefore anticipated. Inventories are +35 TWh (+6% or 0.25 standard deviations) above the ten-year seasonal average. The impact of Russia’s supply reductions to Europe cannot (yet) be identified in the data:

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Best in Energy – 21 June 2022

China power generators relying on lower-quality coal

White House considers suspension of U.S. gasoline tax

Russia becomes top crude oil supplier to China in May

U.S./Germany sign firm LNG export agreement ($WSJ)

Australia’s power shortage will spur more rooftop solar

Iron ore prices fall on China’s building downturn ($FT)

United Kingdom addicted to currency devaluation ($FT)

China scrutinises Musk’s dual-use technologies ($FT)

SOUTHEAST ASIA’s gross refining margin for making gas oil from Dubai crude has climbed to a record $70 per barrel, up from $7 a year ago, as fuel supplies for freight and manufacturing remain at 14-year lows:

EAST CHINA’s temperatures have been 2-5°C higher than the long-term seasonal average since the middle of June, straining power supplies in the Lower Yangtze region and the provinces just to its north, including Jiangsu, Henan and up to Shandong:

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Best in Energy – 13 June 2022

Reuters has launched a new twice-weekly newsletter called Power Up curated by my talented colleague David Gaffen. It covers all Reuters’ top energy stories. If you would like to receive it, you can add your email to the distribution list here: https://www.reuters.com/newsletters/reuters-power-up/

Oil price shock to persist into 2023 ($BBG)

Oil prices expected to rise further ($FT)

U.K. government orders fuel price inquiry

U.S. refinery processing likely to accelerate

U.S. Midwest at risk of blackouts for years

Food versus biofuel – land competition ($FT)

U.S. TREASURY yield curve between two-year and ten-year notes has flattened again in response to faster inflation. Traders anticipate the central bank will have to engineer a harder landing for the economy to bring price increases under control:

BRITAIN’s economy has started to contract as surging inflation hits household and business spending. Real output fell or was flat in four of the five months between December and April. The other major European economies, which publish data with longer delays and less frequency, are probably also on the leading edge of a recession:

Energy sanctions and the impact on prices for consumers

Four case studies from the coal and oil markets

John Kemp

10 June 2022

Conclusion: Energy embargoes increase prices paid by consumers significantly in the short and medium term unless there are alternative supplies readily available to make up the deficit.

Corollary: Boycotts are an attractive policy instrument when excess production capacity (actual or potential) allows energy from sanctioned sources to be replaced by non-sanctioned ones.

Case Study 1: Coal during the English Civil War (1643-1644)

By the mid-17th century, coal had replaced wood as the principal fuel for domestic heating and manufacturing in London and other towns near the east coast of England.

Production was concentrated in Newcastle and the northeast from where it was carried by ship down the coast to London and other major consumption centres in the south.

But in January 1643, Parliament, based in London, banned ships from fetching coal from Newcastle, under royalist control, to deprive King Charles I of revenues and shipping with which to wage war.

Parliament had been assured by Scotland’s coal owners sufficient alternative supplies would be forthcoming to make up the deficit, but this proved incorrect.

Wholesale prices in London doubled to 30-40 shillings per ton in 1643/44 from 15-16 shillings before the ban in 1640.

In response, Parliament and the Lord Mayor and Aldermen of the City of London attempted to fix maximum prices, but this was unsuccessful.

Parliament imposed a forced loan on ship owners and consumers of coal to raise funds for the capture of Newcastle, and the City imposed a levy to raise funds to provide coal for the poor.

“Profiteering continued, and there was seen to be no substitute for north of England coal,” according to historian John Nef.

In June 1644, the Venetian ambassador warned the loss of coal shipments “will be unbearable next winter, as they have felled most of the trees” around London to meet the shortage the previous winter.

In July 1644, the ambassador predicted “there will be riots this winter” unless coal shipments from Newcastle resumed.

The coal shortage was relieved when a Scottish army, encouraged by Parliament and promised income from future coal sales, captured Newcastle in October 1644 and shipments to London resumed.

Sources:

Rise of the British Coal Industry (Volume 2) (Nef, 1932)

Declaration of the Lords and Commons Concerning Coals and Salt (1642)

The English Coasting Trade 1600-1750 (Willan, 1967)

History of the British Coal Industry (Volume 1) (Hatcher, 1993)

Case Study 2: Oil during the Iranian embargo 1951-54

Following nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951, Britain boycotted crude and fuel sales from Iran, and was later joined by most other western-owned oil companies.

In 1950, Iran had produced 660,000 b/d of crude, amounting to 7% of total production in the Western World, of which 150,000 b/d were exported and 510,000 b/d processed at the Abadan refinery.

Abadan was the world’s largest refinery and supplied one-quarter of all the refined products outside the Western Hemisphere.

Nearly all output from Abadan was exported (489,000 b/d) with most of the rest accounted for by the refinery’s own consumption (20,000 b/d) and only small volumes used domestically (1,000 b/d).

The boycott’s impact on crude oil supplies and prices was limited because Iran’s crude oil exports were relatively small and easily replaced from other sources.

Crude production from other countries in the Middle East (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iraq) had already  been increasing rapidly and accelerated further once the boycott was imposed.

Iran’s production declined by -31 million long tons between 1950 and 1952 but that was more than offset by increases from Kuwait (+20 million tons), Saudi Arabia (+15 million) and Iraq (+12 million).

There were also large increases in production in the rest of the world (+69 million tons) mostly from the Caribbean and the United States.

But the impact on refined fuel supplies especially aviation gasoline, kerosene and residual fuel oil east of Suez, was much more severe.

Lost output from Abadan had to be replaced by increased refinery processing in the United States and the Caribbean and to a smaller extent in Western Europe.

Much longer supply routes from western refineries to markets east of Suez strained available tanker capacity.

In response, tanker transport and foreign fuel marketing was coordinated by international oil companies with direction from the U.S. government.

“The Voluntary Agreement Relating to the Supply of Petroleum to Friendly Foreign Nations” was created by the U.S. government to permit the exchange of information and coordination of supplies.

Under the Voluntary Agreement, which conferred antitrust immunity, a Foreign Petroleum Supply Committee involving the international oil companies was organised to coordinate supplies.

During the boycott, the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company brought legal proceedings against oil buyers breaching the boycott for trafficking in stolen property.

Japanese companies were reported to have purchased Iranian oil at discounts of as much as 50% to the official price.

The boycott was eventually lifted in 1954 when the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was replaced by an International Consortium, with the agreement of all parties.

Sources:

Oil in the Middle East: Discovery and Development (Longrigg, 1968)

Middle East Oil Crises and Western Europe’s Oil Supplies (Lubell, 1963)

Probable Developments in Iran through 1953 (NIE-75/1) (Central Intelligence Agency, 1953)

History of the British Petroleum Company (Volume 2) (Bamberg, 1994)

Case Study 3: Oil sanctions on Iraq 1990-1996

Following the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the United Nations imposed a comprehensive economic embargo on Iraq (Security Council Resolution 661) including a prohibition on oil sales.

Iraq’s production declined by -90% from 2.8 million b/d prior to the invasion to 280,000 b/d in 1991 and remained stuck around 500,000 b/d until the oil-for-food program was launched in late 1996.

Initially, the loss of output from Iraq (-2.6 million b/d) and occupied Kuwait (-1.4 million b/d) caused real oil prices to more than double between June and September 1990.

But following the release of IEA strategic petroleum reserves and the successful expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, prices had roughly reverted to pre-invasion levels by March 1991.

Other Middle East producers proved willing and able to increase their production to offset the losses from Iraq and Kuwait and later from Iraq-only under sanctions.

Iraq’s output fell by -2.3 million b/d between 1989 and 1996 but that was more than offset by output from other producers in the Middle East which increased by +6.6 million b/d over the same period.

Total Middle East production increased by +4.3 million b/d between 1989 and 1996 and global output was up by +5.7 million b/d, despite sanctions on Iraq, minimising the impact on prices.

As a result, the period of most intense sanctions on Iraq during the early and mid-1990s was characterised by relatively low and stable prices for consumers.

Sources:

Statistical Review of World Energy (BP, 2021)

Case Study 4: Oil sanctions on Iran 2012-2015 and since 2018

The United States has imposed multiple rounds of  sanctions on Iran since the revolution of 1979 but the most intense restrictions on oil exports were in force between 2012 and 2015 (when sanctions were also imposed by the European Union) and since 2018 (when the United States terminated its participation in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action).

During the most intense period of sanctions, Iran’s oil exports were reduced by up to -1.4 million barrels per day, according to estimates compiled by the U.S. Congressional Research Service.

The sanctions-driven reduction in Iranian exports (actual and prospective) likely contributed to the period of very high prices between 2011 and 2014 and more moderately in 2018.

Real Brent prices averaged $120 between 2011 and 2014, the highest in the history of the oil industry, and were also comparatively high in 2018 compared with 2015-2017 and 2019.

But sanctions on Iran also coincided with the first and second shale drilling booms in the United States which resulted in very rapid growth in U.S. oil production.

U.S. oil production increased by an average of +1 million b/d each year between 2012 and 2014 and by an average of almost +1.5 million b/d each year in 2018 and 2019.

Rapid growth in U.S. production likely emboldened U.S. policymakers to impose stringent sanctions on Iran as well as blunting their impact on prices.

The entire period spanned by sanctions since 2011 also saw very large increases in output from other producers in the Middle East.

Between 2011 and 2019, production increased in Iraq (+2.0 million b/d), Saudi Arabia (+0.8 million b/d) and the United Arab Emirates (+0.7 million b/d) more than offsetting losses from Iran.

Knowing alternative supplies were available, including from domestic producers, likely encouraged the Obama and Trump administrations to pursue more stringent restrictions on Iran’s oil exports.

Stringent sanctions on Iran contributed to high prices for consumers but the impact was moderated over time by growing output from other Middle East producers and especially the U.S. shale industry.

Sanctions on Iran were an important spur for the shale revolution; conversely, the shale boom and reintegration of Iraq into global markets helps explains the severity of U.S. and international sanctions.

Sources:

Iran sanctions – Report for Congress (U.S. Congressional Research Service, 2022)

Statistical Review of World Energy (BP, 2021)

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Best in Energy – 10 June 2022

United States asks India to restrain Russia oil buying ($FT)

U.S/EU explore options to limit Russia’s oil revenues ($WSJ)

EU/UK ban on insuring Russian oil threatens to raise prices

U.S. gas prices to remain high in 2022 before easing in 2023

China freight volumes and logistics return to normal (trans.)

China sends inspectors to coal regions after prices rise ($BBG)

China threatens to punish “price gouging” (trans.) *

* The warning from China’s State Administration for Market Regulation against price gouging echoes ideas and language employed by the Biden administration and U.S. Congress and the UK Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. Policymakers in whatever type of government or historical era always try to deflect blame for rising food and fuel prices on to middlemen and traders.

In medieval England, middlemen could be prosecuted under the common law for the offences of forestalling (buying up supplies before they could be delivered to the market), regrating (buying and reselling at a higher price) and engrossing (buying a large proportion of the available supplies to resell them at a higher price). Present-day governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and China would approve.

FREEPORT LNG’s explosion and shutdown is only expected to have a limited impact on the availability of gas in either the United States or the European Union. The premium for gas deliveries in July 2022 to Northwest Europe compared with Louisiana’s Henry Hub has increased to €56/MWh compared with €50 before the incident. But the spread had already shrunk from €100-180 in March in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The market is relatively well situated at the moment to absorb the loss of Freeport LNG exports. Europe has been overbuying LNG and overfilling storage at an unsustainable rate that would have to slow in any event over the next 1-2 months. At the same time, the United States has been overselling LNG, leaving inventories below average for the time of year, implying exports would have had to slow soon.

Even before the Freeport incident, futures prices were starting to enforce an adjustment, with EU prices softening while U.S. prices were climbing to the highest for more than a decade. The stoppage in exports from the facility is accelerating the correction already underway, tempering the need for a larger price adjustment. As a result, the previous weakening of EU prices has been arrested for now, while the prior rise in U.S. prices has been capped for the time being.

The Freeport incident is not expected to have a major impact on gas availability in the European Union. Europe’s gas futures summer-winter calendar spread from July 2022 to January 2023 is still in a near-record contango of more than €11 per MWh, down only slightly from €14 before the explosion, implying the market remains heavily oversupplied in the short term:

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Best in Energy – 27 May 2022

White House articulates strategy towards China

U.K. announces windfall tax on oil and gas firms

Europe protects households from energy prices

EU runs into problems negotiating Russia oil ban

Offshore drilling experiences cyclical recovery

U.S. hot economy has unwanted side effects ($FT)

Thailand/Vietnam explore rice cartel ($BBG)

Space-based solar power – how realistic is it?

BRENT’s six-month calendar spread is moving into an increasingly steep backwardation again as traders anticipate a growing shortage of crude. High margins for diesel and gasoline are encouraging refineries to maximise crude processing which is intensifying the downward pressure on already-depleted crude inventories:

U.K. DIESEL and gasoline inventories depleted further in March as late-cycle tightness was intensified by the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and some panic-buying by consumers and road haulage firms. Diesel/gas oil stocks were at the lowest seasonal level since 2014 and before that 2006:

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Best in Energy – 20 May 2022

China accelerates purchases of Russian crude*

China increases crude inventories*

China boosts energy imports from Russia ($BBG) *

U.S./China talks on Russia strategic oil purchases*

U.S./China top diplomats hold telephone talks*

United States open to Russia oil secondary sanctions*

China cuts mortgage rates sharply to boost economy

Italy boosts Russian oil imports ($FT)

Germany prepares for rationing industrial gas supply

China completes Daqing coal rail maintenance (trans.)

U.K. postal service to raise prices again as costs surge

U.K. consumer confidence lowest since at least 1974

Finland prepares for end of Russian gas flows ($BBG)

U.K. grid practises black start with renewables ($BBG)

* An interesting cluster of stories has emerged over the last 24 hours about China increasing crude oil purchases from Russia, but using the extra volumes to replenish strategic reserves, which the White House says would not violate any sanctions. The first six items should all be read in this context.

China does not report commercial or strategic reserves and there is less distinction between them than for IEA countries, so there is no way of ascertaining whether extra crude is really going into strategic inventories or being added to commercial stocks to be refined or depleted later. The concept of “replenishment” of strategic stocks is also curious because China did not join the U.S.-led emergency oil releases in late 2021 and early 2022.

An outside observer might conclude China is boosting its purchases of deeply discounted Russian crude, but the White House has decided to ignore it, at least for the time being, because it does not want to risk triggering a further rise in prices, especially before congressional elections in November, where inflation is emerging as the dominant political issue.

U.S. FINANCIAL CONDITIONS were tightening rapidly even before this week’s tumble in equity prices, as access to credit and risk capital becomes more restricted and expensive:

EUROPE’s GAS FUTURES summer-winter calendar spread from July 2022 to January 2023 has moved into a small contango of €2/MWh, down from a record backwardation of more than €70 in early March, as storage fills at record rates and inventories become more comfortable:

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Best in Energy – 18 May 2022

EU cannot be a green island in a dirty world ($FT)

Oil consumption and moderate recessions ($BBG)

U.S./EU examine Russia oil embargo + tariff plan

U.K. inflation accelerates to 9% fastest since 1982

China’s LNG imports set to rise from August ($BBG)

U.K. explores extensions for coal and nuclear ($BBG)

Texas electricity supply hit by congestion on grid

German refinery at risk from Russian oil ban ($BBG)

Austria tries to encourage industry to store gas

U.K. orders competition probe into fuel retailing

U.S. MANUFACTURING output in the three months Feb-Apr was almost 6% higher than in the same period a year earlier, showing momentum in the business cycle but also why supply chains are struggling to cope and prices are escalating rapidly. Rapid growth in manufacturing explains why diesel is short supply and prices are escalating:

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